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Abstract: 
Minimum wage laws have become a key political issue, following on the heels of over 
130 successful living wage campaigns around the country. In the debates surrounding 
these mandated wage floors, one recurring issue has been whether the legislation has 
wider-ranging impacts on wages than the legally-required raises alone. Advocates on 
both sides of the debate dispute the potential magnitude of 'ripple effects'- the non-
mandated raises given by employers to maintain a similar wage hierarchy before and 
after a change in the wage floor. These ripple effects have the potential to greatly expand 
the overall impact of mandated wage floors. This study uses data from twenty years of 
the Current Population Survey to assess the magnitude of ripple effects in the context of 
variations in minimum wage laws, and looks specifically at the retail trade sector to 
model the potential magnitude of ripple effects under living wage ordinances, where the 
'bite' of the legislation would encompass a larger share of the workforce. 
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Introduction 
 
Statewide minimum wage ballot initiatives have made minimum wage laws a key 
political issue for the 2006 mid-term elections. These political campaigns follow on the 
heels of over 130 successful living wage campaigns to enact municipal-level wage 
minimums in the last ten years. Moreover, the relatively high wage floors set by living 
wage laws (nearly double minimum wage levels, on average) distinguish them from most 
minimum wage laws, raising the stakes of winning or losing these political fights 
(Brenner and Luce, 2005). This recent upsurge of interest in establishing new and higher 
wage floors has recharged the academic, as well as, political debate around the economic 
impact of mandated wage floors.  
One reoccurring issue in these debates is whether mandated wage floors have a 
more wide-ranging impact on wages than the legally-required raises alone. In response to 
new wage minimums, some employers give non-mandated raises, or “ripple effect” 
raises, in order to maintain a similar hierarchy of wages before and after the change in the 
wage floor. By expanding the number of workers who receive raises, these ripple-effect 
raises have the potential to considerably change the overall impact of mandated wage 
floors.  
Both sides of the political debate around mandated wage floors have a stake in 
arguing that ripple effects are both large and small. Large ripple effects allow proponents 
 to argue that mandated wage floors have an even greater potential to reduce poverty by 
expanding the number of beneficiaries. Opponents, however, can argue that large ripple 
effects seriously intensify the economic strain on employers from such laws. Small ripple 
effects enable proponents to minimize estimates of the economic costs to employers of 
mandated wage floors. But, likewise, small ripple effects allow opponents to minimize 
their estimated benefits. Regardless of one’s political position, understanding the extent 
and size of ripple effects is an important part of evaluating mandated wage floors.  
Past research on mandated wage floors does not provide a clear picture of the size 
and extent of ripple effects. I attempt to fill this gap by providing detailed empirical 
estimates of the ripple effects produced by state and federal minimum wage increases in 
the United States from 1983-2002 using Current Population Survey (CPS) data.  
I find that adding ripple-effect raises to mandated raises dramatically increases the 
number of minimum wage beneficiaries. These raises substantially increase the costs of 
minimum wage increases to employers: the average ripple effect “multiplier” is 2.5, 
meaning that the total cost increase from a minimum wage increase—including both 
mandated and ripple-effect raises—is 250 percent of the cost increase from mandated 
raises only. This occurs even though the extent of ripple effects is limited. Raises from 
ripple effects only extend up to workers earning 123 percent of the minimum wage prior 
to the increase. 
I also look at the special case of the retail trade industry1 where minimum wage 
workers are concentrated. If mandated raises from a minimum wage increase impacts the 
                                                 
1 Because of the conversion from the SIC to NAICS industry classification system in 2003 in the CPS, 
retail trade includes different industries prior to 2003 than in the years 2003 and on. In particular, prior to 
2003, retail trade included “Eating and Drinking places.” The NAICS system introduced a new category, 
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 retail trade wage structure more dramatically than in any other industry, do retail trade 
employers also make more dramatic adjustments to their wage scales through ripple-
effect raises? I find that retail trade employers do not make more extensive adjustments 
despite the stronger “bite” of the minimum wage in this industry. Instead, mandated 
raises make up a larger proportion of the overall cost increases faced by employers than 
ripple-effect raises. The ripple-effect multiplier in retail trade is smaller at 1.9 than in the 
general case. 
Accounting for ripple effects also changes the demographic profile of minimum 
wage beneficiaries. Adult workers with greater financial responsibilities in their families 
make up an even larger majority of minimum wage beneficiaries when ripple effects are 
accounted for, increasing from 61 to 69 percent.  
These ripple effect estimates provide an important insight into the likely impact of 
the increasingly popular living wage laws. The retail trade analysis indicates that when a 
mandated wage floor has a stronger bite, the ripple-effect multiplier shrinks. Because 
living wage laws have an even stronger “bite” among covered employers than in the case 
of minimum wage laws among retail trade employers, the results of this research suggests 
that the cost increases that employers bear (and the wage benefits that workers obtain) 
from living wage laws will be primarily from mandated raises rather than ripple-effect 
raises. This insight provides a much needed guideline for assessing the economic impact 
of living wage laws. 
 
What are Ripple Effects? 
                                                                                                                                                 
separate from retail trade called “Accommodation and Food Services” that includes “Food Services and 
Drinking Places.” Retail trade in this paper refers to the SIC industry category. 
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Ripple effects are the raises that employers feel compelled to give workers 
beyond those legally required when a mandated wage floor is increased. Consider this 
basic scenario: If the current $5.15 federal minimum is increased to $6.15, employers are 
legally required to raise the wages of all covered workers earning less than $6.15. 
However, without a ripple effect, workers earning $6.15 prior to the minimum increase 
will fall in their relative wage position: their wage position falls from $1.00 above the 
bottom of the wage structure to the bottom of the wage structure. Moreover, these 
workers will be earning the same wages as workers who had previously earned inferior 
wages. Such a fall in relative wage position could damage worker morale, and therefore, 
productivity. To avoid this, employers extend raises above the wage floor to maintain a 
consistent wage hierarchy. As a result, workers earning $6.15 prior to the increase may 
receive a “ripple effect” raise to keep their wage position above the bottom of the wage 
structure.  
Ripple effects may alternatively be caused by employers substituting low-skilled 
workers with high-skilled workers. In response to an increase in the wage floor, 
employers may increase their demand for high-skilled workers who typically earn wages 
above the minimum. This increased demand for high-skilled workers can push their 
wages upwards. Consequently, not only are the wages of workers earning the minimum 
receiving raises but so too are workers at higher wage rates. Regardless of the cause, 
minimum wage increases have the potential to raise the wages of more jobs than those 
bound by the minimum through ripple effects.  
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 The Extent and Size of Ripple Effects 
 
This study advances beyond past research by providing detailed estimates of the 
extent and size of ripple effects while controlling for macroeconomic trends and changes 
in workforce composition.2,3 Specifically, I use Current Population Survey data from 
1983 to 2002 and regression analysis to estimate how state and federal minimum wage 
changes impact wage growth at various points of states’ wage distributions as defined by 
wage percentiles. 
The regression estimates indicate that the extent of the ripple effect is limited to a 
narrow band of wages above the minimum wage and that the raises quickly diminish the 
higher the worker’s wage rate. The impact of minimum wage increases is strongest at the 
5th wage percentile which is, on average, equal to the minimum wage (see figure 1). The 
estimated wage elasticity of 0.44 indicates that for every 10 percent increase in the 
minimum wage, the 5th wage percentile increases 4.4 percent. Take for example, the last 
federal minimum wage increase of 1997 from $4.75 to $5.15, an eight percent increase. 
Workers earning wages around the old minimum of $4.75, on average, received a raise of 
four percent (0.08 x 0.44 = 0.35), or $0.17, to $4.92 (see table 1). 
Why doesn’t the fifth wage percentile reflect increases equivalent to the minimum 
wage increase (i.e., have a wage elasticity of one)? Because the 5th wage percentile drifts 
                                                 
2 The regression analysis allows for both contemporaneous and lagged minimum wage effects on the wage 
percentiles. 
3 Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher (2004) also offer a serious attempt to address these weaknesses. Using 
regression analysis, they estimate how minimum wage changes affect wage growth across the wage 
distribution during 1979-1997. Unfortunately, their study likely produces unreliable results because their 
model specification appears to exacerbate the measurement error in their wage measure (see Wicks-Lim 
(2005) for a full critique of their methodology). Consequently, their unlikely results—such as a positive 
minimum wage effect on the wages of workers earning very high wages and a negative minimum wage 
effect for almost every segment of the wage distribution one year after a minimum wage increase—appear 
to reflect problems in their methodology. 
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 above and below the minimum wage over time and across states, the wage elasticity 
reflects an average of the wage responses to minimum wage changes among a 
combination of sub-minimum wage workers, minimum wage workers, and workers 
earning wages very close to, but above, the minimum wage. From other analyses not 
presented here, I found that sub-minimum wage workers do not receive wage raises equal 
to minimum wage increases.4  Workers earning wages very near but above the minimum 
do not require equivalent wage increases to minimum wage increases to meet or exceed 
the new minimum. These two influences push the wage elasticity of the 5th wage 
percentile below one. While those workers earning exactly the minimum wage likely 
move in tandem with the minimum wage, the workers earning wages around (i.e., above 
and below) the minimum move less than the minimum wage. 
Workers with wages around the 10th wage percentile receive, on average, a 2.5 
percent increase for every 10 percent increase in the minimum (i.e., a wage elasticity of 
0.25). The 10th wage percentile is typically 115 percent of the minimum wage prior to the 
increase. Applying this to the 1997 federal minimum increase, workers earning around 
$5.22 got two percent raises (0.025 x 0.08 = 0.02), roughly ten cents to $5.32.  
The highest point in the wage distribution with a detectable impact from 
minimum wage changes is the 15th wage percentile. Since there is no detectable impact at 
the 20th wage percentile, the 15th wage percentile approximates the lower-bound of the 
ripple effect’s upper limit. Workers with wages around the 15th wage percentile typically 
earn 123 percent of the minimum wage. These workers receive, on average, a 1.4 percent 
raise for every 10 percent increase in the minimum wage (i.e., a wage elasticity of 0.14). 
                                                 
4 One reason for this is that some sub-minimum wage workers are subject to tip credit allowances which do 
not automatically change when minimum wage levels are changed. 
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 The eight percent federal minimum increase in 1997 produced a one percent raise for 
workers earning around $5.74 (0.14 x 0.08 = 0.01), or seven cents, to $5.81.  
These estimates indicate a compressed wage distribution after the minimum wage 
increase. In the wage distribution after the minimum wage increase, the 15th wage 
percentile sits within about 65 cents of the $5.15 wage floor. Prior to the minimum wage 
increase, the 15th wage percentile was almost one dollar higher than the $4.75 wage floor. 
  
The Overall Impact of Ripple Effects 
 
Despite the limited extent of ripple effects, these wage raises nevertheless 
considerably expand the overall impact of minimum wage increases. This result is driven 
by the fact that the number of workers with wages just above the minimum greatly 
outnumbers workers earning the minimum. To illustrate, I present in table 1 estimates of 
the wage raises that occurred in response to the 1997 federal minimum wage. The third 
column presents the number of workers that earned wages around the 5th, 10th, and 15th 
wage percentiles prior to the federal minimum increase. Since the 5th wage percentile sits 
right at the minimum wage level, these workers are assumed to receive mandated raises. 
Based on this example, almost triple the number of minimum wage workers (those 
earning wages around the 5th percentile) earned wages around the 10th and 15th wage 
percentiles. In other words, the high concentration of workers near but above the 
minimum wage produces a large ripple effect. 
To provide a measure of how important the ripple effect is in the overall impact of 
minimum wage increases, I calculated a “ripple-effect multiplier” (see table 1). To do 
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 this, I estimated the total change in employers’ annual wage bills caused by the 1997 
federal minimum wage increases due to mandated raises and ripple-effect raises 
separately. The ripple-effect multiplier then quantifies how much the ripple-effect raises 
multiply the change in employers’ annual wage bills from mandated wage raises alone. 
Specifically, I multiplied the number of workers that earned wages around each wage 
percentile (column 3) by their average raises as estimated by the regression analysis 
(column 4), their average hours per week (column 5) and their average weeks worked per 
year (column 6).  
I estimate that employers responded to the federal minimum wage increase by 
providing roughly 4 million workers with $741 million in mandated raises (column 7).  
Ripple effects provide another 11.5 million workers with $1.3 billion dollars in raises 
(column 8), nearly quadrupling the number of minimum wage beneficiaries and almost 
tripling the overall increase to employers’ annual wage bills. In other words, with regard 
to the overall change in the wage bill, ripple effects multiply the cost increase to 
employers by 270 percent ((741.0+1280.3)/741.0) producing a ripple-effect multiplier of 
2.7. Similar calculations based on the other three federal minimum wage increases of the 
1990s produce an average ripple-effect multiplier of 2.5. 
  
Is the Ripple Effect Stronger When the Minimum Wage Has a Stronger “Bite”?  
 
To examine whether minimum wage increases with a stronger “bite” produce 
stronger ripple effects, I did a separate regression analysis on retail trade workers. I 
focused on the retail trade industry because a greater proportion of retail trade workers 
8 of 22
 earn the minimum wage than in any other industry. In 2002, for example, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics reported that three percent of all workers paid hourly earned wages at or 
below the federal minimum. Among hourly-wage workers in the retail trade industry the 
proportion is more than twice as high at eight percent. Clearly, the minimum wage has a 
stronger “bite” in the retail trade industry compared to other industries. If a minimum 
wage increase requires retail trade employers to give a higher proportion of workers 
mandated raises as compared to other employers, retail trade employers may also need to 
make more extensive adjustments to their wage scales in the form of ripple-effect raises. 
The impact of minimum wages in the retail trade industry has virtually the same 
pattern as that found for the entire economy, both in terms of extent and magnitude (see 
figure 2). Instead of producing a qualitatively different effect, the high concentration of 
minimum and near minimum wage workers in the retail trade industry provides a more 
detailed view of the minimum wage effect because each wage percentile characterizes a 
narrower range of wages.5 As a result, the high wage elasticity of 0.73 for the 10th 
percentile of the retail trade industry is a more precise estimate for minimum wage 
workers than the lower wage elasticity of 0.44 for the 5th wage percentile across 
industries.  
The limited extent of the ripple effect in combination with a relatively high 
concentration of minimum wage workers in the retail trade industry suggests that ripple-
effect raises will contribute less to the overall impact of minimum wage increases in this 
                                                 
5 To see this, consider that the 10th wage percentile is equal to, on average, 99 percent of the minimum 
wage. The 15th wage percentile, the next percentile for which I produce estimates for, is only four 
percentage points higher than the 10th wage percentile in terms of its position relative to the minimum, at 
103 percent of the minimum wage. Across industries, the 5th wage percentile—the percentile closest to the 
minimum—is, on average, 100 percent of the minimum wage. The 10th percentile, the next percentile for 
which I produce estimates for, is much further from the minimum than the 5th wage percentile, at 112 
percent of the minimum wage. 
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 industry. In table 2, I repeat the calculations of table 1 for the retail trade industry only. 
As expected, the heavy concentration of workers at the wage floor in this sector 
diminishes the size of the ripple-effect multiplier to 1.6.  Similar calculations for the other 
three federal minimum wage increases of the 1990s suggest an average ripple-effect 
multiplier for the retail trade industry of 1.9. 
 
The Impact of Ripple Effects on Cost Increases to Businesses  
 
The actual economic impact of the costs increases associated with minimum 
wages can only be assessed when put into context with some measure of businesses’ 
capacity to absorb these costs. One way to evaluate this capacity is to compare the 
increased costs to businesses’ sales revenue. I did such a comparison in a 2004 study with 
Robert Pollin and Mark Brenner of the economic impact of proposed $6.15 state 
minimum wage in Florida, increasing the effective minimum wage by one dollar from the 
federal minimum of $5.15. We estimated the associated cost increases of the minimum 
wage proposal for both mandated and ripple-effect raises as a percentage of businesses’ 
sales revenue. The estimated ripple effects were of a similar, though somewhat larger, 
magnitude as those reported in this current study.  
We found that, on average, the total cost increases associated with the Florida 
minimum wage proposal amounted to less than one percent of a business’ sales revenue. 
The mandated raises alone accounted for less than one-half of one percent of businesses’ 
sales revenue. Viewed in this context, it is clear that the large multiplier effect of ripple-
effect raises basically does not change the economic burden of minimum wage laws on 
10 of 22
 businesses. If the typical business in Florida wanted to cover fully the total costs of the 
minimum wage increase through price increases, they would have to raise their prices by 
less than one percent. This is true, even though the number of workers receiving ripple-
effect raises in Florida was 550,000, nearly double the 300,000 workers receiving 
mandated raises under the $6.15 proposal.  
 
The Impact of Ripple Effects on the Demographic Profile of Minimum Wage 
Beneficiaries 
 
These minimum wage ripple effect estimates adds new insight in the debate over 
whether the benefits of minimum wage laws are well targeted. A longstanding critique of 
using minimum wage laws to reduce poverty is that some minimum wage beneficiaries 
are secondary earners (wage earners that do not contribute a large share to their family’s 
income). If ripple effects almost triple the number of workers affected by minimum wage 
increases, the demographic profile of minimum wage beneficiaries may change 
dramatically when ripple-effect raises are considered. 
Table 3 provides one illustration of how the demographic profile of affected 
workers can change when ripple-effect raises are taken into account using the 2000-2002 
Annual Social and Economic Supplements of the CPS.6 The first column presents the 
average demographic characteristics of workers earning wages around the 5th wage 
percentile in 2000 ($5.50, averaged across states). These workers would most likely 
receive only mandated raises if the federal minimum rose by 13.4 percent—the same 
                                                 
6 These years are chosen in order to pick a point in time that is neither very close to nor very far from a 
federal minimum wage increase because the type of workers near the bottom of the wage distribution may 
be affected by the relatively high or low real value (respectively) of the federal minimum. 
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 amount as in 1990—to $5.85. In the second column, I present the demographic 
characteristics of all workers expected to receive wage increases due to a minimum wage 
increase, i.e., workers earning up to $7.15, just beyond the average 15th wage percentile 
in 2000 ($6.83, averaged across states). 
The most striking difference between the two demographic profiles is the fall in 
the proportion of teenagers and traditionally-aged students (16 to 24 years old)—the 
types of workers usually identified as secondary wage earners.  The proportion of 
teenagers falls from 33 percent to 25 percent and the proportion of traditionally-aged 
students falls from 31 percent to 24 percent. Expanding the scope of minimum wage 
effects to include ripple effects substantially reduces the overall proportion of these 
young workers from 39 percent to 31 percent among the expected beneficiaries of a 
minimum wage increase. This demographic shift reflects a greater presence of primary 
wage earners among affected workers when ripple-effect raises are taken into account. 
The average worker’s contribution toward his/her family’s income is higher among all 
affected workers (39 percent) than among only workers expected to receive mandated 
raises (34 percent), a statistically significant difference. 
 
Implications for Living Wage Laws 
 
These results also provide insight into the likely role of ripple effects in the 
context of living wage laws. Living wage laws typically call for much higher wage floors 
than state and federal minimum wage laws because their levels are explicitly tied to wage 
rates that provide a “livable income” such as the federal poverty-level income threshold 
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 for a family of three. Minimum wage rates, on the other hand, are not. The difference 
between these two types of mandated wage floors is dramatic: Living wage laws typically 
raise the wage floor to levels that are almost twice as high federal and state minimum 
wages. For example, the current New Mexico state minimum wage is set at $5.15, 
equivalent to the federal rate. In the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico, however, a citywide 
living wage rate is set at $9.50, 84 percent higher than the state minimum. 
Do the higher wage minimums of living wage laws, relative to state and federal 
minimum wage laws, cause employers to provide more extensive ripple-effect raises? 
The estimates from the retail trade analysis partly answer this question. Similar to the 
case of retail trade, living wage laws require that a significantly larger proportion of 
workers receive mandated raises than in the general case of minimum wage laws. For 
example, when Santa Fe’s living wage was originally set at $8.50 in 2004, Pollin (2003) 
estimated that 16.4 percent of Santa Fe’s workforce would receive mandated wage 
raises—more than four times the percentage of workers likely to receive mandated wage 
raises from a federal minimum wage increase (see table 3). Based on the retail trade 
analysis, I found that this factor does not produce more extensive ripple effects. The 
implication for living wage laws is that their higher wage minimums will not produce 
more extensive ripple effects than those found in the case of minimum wage laws.  
In fact, because many more workers of covered employers receive mandated 
raises from living wage laws than minimum wage laws, the role of ripple-effect raises in 
the overall impact of living wage laws should be smaller than in the case of minimum 
wage laws. In other words, the cost increases that employers face (and the wage benefits 
that workers receive) from living wage laws will likely be primarily due to mandated 
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 raises rather than ripple-effect raises, converse the general case of minimum wage laws. 
As a result, a reasonable guideline for assessing the economic impact of living wage laws 
is that ripple-effect raises will make up a smaller—probably significantly smaller—
proportion of the overall change in the wage bill than in the case of minimum wage laws.  
There are a couple reasons why living wage laws may produce ripple effects that 
behave differently from the ripple effects estimated from minimum wage laws. First, the 
workers just above the higher living wage levels (reaching as high as $15.52 in 
Burlington, Vermont) may have greater bargaining power than workers just above 
minimum wage levels (the highest is only $7.63 in Washington state), and thus better 
able to obtain raises when a living wage law is enacted. In that case, living wage laws 
may produce more extensive ripple effects because different types of workers—perhaps 
more skilled or more unionized—sit just above the new wage floor.  
Second, living wage laws typically cover only employers with financial ties to 
their municipal government, such as city contractors. As a result, the coverage of living 
wage laws is typically no more than two percent of workers within a city (Neumark and 
Adams, 2003). Minimum wage laws tend to have virtually universal coverage. This 
aspect of living wage laws introduce the possibility of ripple effects across firms in 
addition to ripple effects up the wage scale within covered firms. Employers who are not 
covered by living wage laws may increase the wages of their workers as they compete for 
workers within the same local labor market as covered employers. This additional source 
of ripple-effect raises may cause the ripple effect to larger than suggested by the above 
analysis. 
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 However, the empirical evidence thus far supports the conclusion that the ripple-
effect multiplier from living wage laws will tend to be much smaller than that of 
minimum wage laws. Two case studies, one of San Francisco’s living wage law, and the 
other of Los Angeles’ living wage law, suggest that ripple-effect raises added only 13 to 
35 percent to the cost increases from mandated raises (Reich, Hall, and Jacobs, 2003; 
Fairris, Runsten, Briones, and Goodheart, 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research brief presents the results of new research on the question of whether 
mandated wage floors have a wider impact on wages—through ripple effects—than 
required by law. The results suggest that ripple effects have the potential to change 
dramatically the overall impact of mandated wage floors. However, how much ripple-
effect raises contribute to the overall impact of mandated wage floors varies. 
In the case of minimum wage laws, ripple-effect raises can as much as triple the 
costs associated with a minimum wage increase and nearly quadruple the number of 
workers who benefit from such an increase. However, because the cost of legally-
required raises—as measured as a percentage of businesses’ sales revenue—is so small, 
adding ripple-effect raises to the overall costs associated with minimum wage increases 
still generally represent a very small cost burden for employers. Ripple effects do tend to 
make minimum wage laws somewhat better targeted. With ripple effects, the pool of 
minimum wage beneficiaries includes more low-wage adult workers and fewer teenage 
and traditionally-aged student workers.  
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 The minimum wage ripple effect estimates suggest that the case of living wage 
laws—with their much higher wage floors—is different. In particular, the analysis of 
minimum-wage ripple effects within the low-wage retail trade industry provides a look at 
what happens when a change in the mandated wage floor has a more dramatic impact on 
the wage structure through mandated raises alone—similar to living wage laws—than the 
general case of minimum wage laws. I find that the minimum wage does not produce a 
more dramatic ripple effect even though it has a stronger “bite” in retail trade. In fact, in 
retail trade, mandated wage raises are more prevalent than ripple-effect raises. 
Consequently, the ripple-effect multiplier is smaller when the minimum wage has a 
stronger “bite.”  This result implies an even smaller ripple-effect multiplier in the case of 
living wage laws which have an even stronger “bite” among covered employers than in 
the case of minimum wage laws and retail trade employers. In other words, living wage 
laws should be expected to generate cost increases for employers, as well as the wage 
benefits for workers, mainly through mandated wage increases rather than ripple-effect 
raises, converse the general case of minimum wage laws. 
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Figure 1: Estimated Wage Elasticities by Wage Percentile
All Industries
Source: Current Population Survey, 1983-2002.
Notes: Wage effects combine immediate and lagged minimum wage effects. For a full methodological 
discussion see Wicks-Lim 2005. Refinements to that analysis to control for spurious results cause the 
estimates to vary slightly from original results.Details may be obtained from author by request.
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Figure 2: Estimated Wage Elasticities by Wage Percentile
Retail Trade Industry Only
Notes: See Figure 1.
Source: Current Population Survey, 1983-2002.
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Table 3: Demographic Profiles of Workers in 2000
Workers expected to 
receive mandated 
raises only from 
hypothetical Federal 
minimum increase
All workers expected 
to receive raises from 
hypothetical Federal 
minimum increase
Total $5.15-$5.85 $5.15-$7.15
Individual Characteristics
Average Hourly Wage $16.27 $5.52 $6.17
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Student and 16-24 yrs. old 6.5% 31.1% 24.0%
(0.06) (0.72) (0.37)
Teenager 6.8% 33.3% 25.4%
(0.06) (0.72) (0.37)
Student or Teenager 8.6% 38.7% 30.6%
(0.07) (0.73) (0.39)
Non-white 24.5% 29.7% 30.3%
(0.00) (0.62) (0.35)
Female 48.2% 57.5% 58.3%
(0.00) (0.69) (0.38)
No High School Diploma 13.8% 37.3% 32.0%
(0.00) (0.38) (0.36)
Age 38.2 30.1 32.1
(0.03) (0.21) (0.12)
Usual hours worked/week 39.3 30.6 32.7
(0.03) (0.18) (0.10)
Family Characteristics
Family Income $66,623 $47,981 $46,348
(139.70) (716.07) (373.37)
Worker's Earnings as % of Family Income 60.8% 33.9% 38.9%
(3.60) (0.48) (0.30)
Severely Poor (Federal Poverty Level) 5.4% 17.1% 14.3%
(0.06) (0.52) (0.27)
Low-Income (200% Federal Poverty Level) 18.5% 45.5% 44.9%
(0.09) (0.69) (0.38)
Number of Workers (in millions) 134.8 4.8 14.4
% of Workforce 100% 3.6% 10.7%
Notes: Dollar values are in 2000$. Standard errors are in parentheses. CPS supplemental weights were 
adjusted to account for differences in reporting errors between March ASEC earnings data and CPS ORG 
wage data.
Source: CPS March Annual Demographic File 2000-2002. 
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